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UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, B E R K E L E Y Department of Economics Berkeley, California 94720 Working Paper No. 89-103 Product Line Rivalry with Brand Differentiation Richard J. Gilbert and Carmen Matutes January 1989 Key words: product differentiation, entry, oligopoly Abstract Competition with product rivalry is examined in a model where products are differentiated by both quality and brand name. With no commitments, symmetric equilibria exist where firms produce all products and the mark-ups over marginal cost and profits are identical to the mark-ups and profits with single product firms. If product innovation is costly, there is a prisoners'dilemrna in product introduction. When firms can commit to restrict their product offerings, firms will specialize in different products if the degree of brand-specific differentiation is small, but will produce all products if the degree of brand-specific differentiation is sufficiently large.
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Gilbert et al. (1993) studied this question.
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