Foreign aid and political conditionality: Issues of effectiveness and consistency

This article examines the implementation of political conditionality by four official aid donors in the 1990s. It explores the aid sanctions taken globally to leverage improvements in respect of human rights and democratic principles, and assesses donor policy practice along two lines of investigation ‐ effectiveness and consistency. A main finding is the ineffectiveness of aid restrictions in contributing to political reforms in recipient countries. This is accounted for more by the weakness of measures imposed than by the strength of recipient governments, questioning the seriousness of donor intent in many cases. Regarding consistency, a pattern of selective and inconsistent policy application is revealed. The increased rhetorical support for democracy and human rights by northern governments post‐cold war has not led to a corresponding change towards the fair and equal treatment of all nations. The continued subordination of human rights and democracy to other foreign policy concerns, notably economic self‐interest, not only undermines policy credibility and legitimacy, but also limits impact and effectiveness. Donors themselves have introduced a normative dimension to aid policy. Yet if their own commitment to the principles of human rights and democracy is at best partial, they can hardly require development partners to abide by them in a manner that commands respect.