Congressional Elections and the Pork Barrel

It is an enduring belief in American politics that legislators who "bring home the bacon" are rewarded for their efforts at the ballot box. Most researchers, however, have been unsuccessful in corroborating empirically a relationship between allocations to member districts and reelection margins. Previous research may have failed to detect a relationship due to misconceptualization, misspecified empirical tests, or both. We argue that not all legislators have the same incentives to utilize pork-barrel strategies to enhance their electoral margins. Furthermore the extent to which voters are influenced by the provision of distributive benefits is likely to depend on the attentiveness of voters to politics, their interest group affiliations, and their sources of political information. In short, both the predisposition to engage in pork-barrel strategies and their effects are likely to be conditional. Hypotheses derived from this respecification of the electoral connection thesis are tested with a data base that combines information on domestic assistance awards to congressional districts, information about members of Congress, and the political knowledge and group affiliations of individual voters. We find that only some incumbents, namely those who are most vulnerable, are likely to seek increases in new awards. Certain constituents, those who are politically attentive members or interest groups are most likely to be aware of new awards to the district and to more favorably evaluate the incumbent as a result. Most members of general public remain indifferent to alterations in the flow of new awards.