Answers are grounded in this paper and cite their sources.
Deterrence and retribution are among the most significant motives for punishing offenders. Using experimental data, we analyze whether enforcers in a deterrence-and-retribution regime punish offenders differently than enforcers in a retribution-only regime. In contrast to previous results, we find that the deterrence potential is a significant motive for punishment. The possibility of deterrence increases the average sanction by 50% and the probability that an enforcer will punish by 40%. Exploring how punishment changes when potential offenders learn the injunctive social norm regarding the offense before their violation decision, we find that the punishment probability increases only in the deterrence-and-retribution regime but not in the retribution-only one. The interaction of punishment and social norms depends on the punishment motive.
No takes yet. Share an insight, caveat, or question.
Baumann et al. (2025) studied this question.
Synapse has enriched 10 related papers. Consider them for comparative context: