Will Rational People Rebel against Inequality? Samson's Choice

Does inequality move rational people to rebellion? To address this question I examine rational actor (RA) models consisting of a game between Haves and Have-Nots in which both choose to engage in economic activity or political violence given inequality in wealth or inequality in income. Pure RA models show that rational people do not rebel against inequality. Inequality thus does not directly affect conflict. In order to locate a direct inequality-conflict (I-C) relationship, two competing RA models based on the deprived actor (DA) research program are also developed. Mixed RA/DA models also show that inequality does not move rational people to rebellion. Two test implications of the models are developed. First, cross-sectional statistical tests of the I-C nexus may show a spurious relationship between inequality and conflict. Second, relative deprivation in bilateral conflicts may produce what I call Samson's choice: rational actors will maximize their opponent's pain rather than their own pleasure and thus choose (not) to rebel when it is contrary to their own interests.