The threat‐enhancing effect of authoritarian power sharing

Power‐sharing deals can potentially solve the autocrat's commitment problem, yet often fail to prevent conflict. This article develops a dynamic model to examine a largely overlooked friction: Sharing power within an authoritarian regime bolsters the opposition's coercive capabilities. The resultant threat‐enhancing effect creates two distinct commitment problems for the opposition, which determine if and when power sharing occurs. First, the opposition cannot commit to refrain from leveraging its enhanced threat. The ruler prefers to incur a revolt than peacefully share power if the threat‐enhancing effect is large. Second, the threat‐enhancing effect tempts the opposition to wait for a future power‐sharing deal, which undercuts the opposition's commitment to revolt today. New dynamic implications arise: delayed power sharing, conflict, or an increased willingness for the ruler to share power are all possible. Scrutinizing the opposition's limited commitment ability contrasts with the predominant existing focus on the autocrat's commitment problem.