Abstract Why do some peace agreements lead to electoral reforms rather than guaranteeing power to rebels through implementing power-sharing guarantees? This research question has not been thoroughly explored in the peace science literature. In this article, I argue that strategic interactions between the government and rebels with distinct attributes answer this question. Electoral participation provisions will be more likely to be implemented when stronger center-seeking rebels participate in peace negotiations. Unlike weaker center-seeking rebels, they push for extensive political power-sharing guarantees, and negotiations will be focused on the government's effort to minimize the rebels' access to significant power in the center by alternatively offering electoral participation provisions. In contrast, both stronger and weaker territorial rebels will seek territorial power-sharing or political power-sharing guarantees that enable them to govern their territories, as their primary goal is securing local/regional autonomy. Such demands are more acceptable to the government as they do not require significant concessions of power in the center. I assess my theory using global power-sharing agreements covering the period from 1975 to 2021. The findings provide empirical support for my expectations and are also robust to different measurements and model specifications. I conclude this article by discussing the implications of these findings.
Sung Min Yun (Wed,) studied this question.