The legacy of rebel taxation on post-conflict fiscal capacity

Civil wars often erode state sovereignty, as institutions are replaced or co-opted by armed groups that establish informal governance structures. Among these, rebel taxation emerges as a key tool for financing wartime activities but also for administering territories. In this article, we explore whether wartime rebel taxation shapes post-conflict governments’ fiscal capacity, drawing on cross-national data from post-conflict states in Africa between 2000 and 2015. We emphasize the dual nature of rebel taxation. On the one hand, rebel taxation creates institutions and routines that may support post-conflict enforcement and compliance, especially when rebel groups are part of or co-opted into post-conflict politics. On the other hand, rebel taxation can undermine state authority by entrenching informal systems and introducing an alternative fiscal contract between citizens and non-state actors that may be hard to replace. Our analysis supports the first argument, finding a positive association between rebel taxation and post-conflict tax revenues. This result is especially pronounced in conflicts that ended without decisive military victories, suggesting that complete capitulation of rebels or governments hinders the integration of wartime taxation in post-conflict fiscal bureaucracy. Our findings highlight the enduring impact of rebel taxation on state capacity in post-conflict environments.