The Conflicting Excellences of Oppositional Sports

In this article I develop my argument for a shallow interpretivist theory of sport by showing that whereas it applies to all oppositional sports, the standard theory of sport for the past twenty years or so, broad internalism, does not. Using Scott Kretchmar’s distinction between tests and contests I argue that contrary to Kretchmar’s view, whereas contests in test-based games are derived from some foundational test, the converse is true for oppositional games. The tests of oppositional games and sports are derived from the contest, and more specifically from opposing competitors. This means that there are no foundational tests in oppositional sports because the excellences necessary for success necessarily conflict. Since broad internalism is marked by the sort of essentialism underlying the test-based conception of sport, and its corresponding privileging of some consistent and foundational set of skills and abilities, it therefore follows that broad internalism does not apply to oppositional sports. Instead we must look to shallow interpretivism to understand the nature of test-based and oppositional sports.