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This study establishes a tripartite evolutionary game model based on the assumptions of bounded rationality and the interaction behavior of governments, owners, and general contractors to examine how strategies are changing for three stakeholders regarding the building information modeling (BIM) application in engineering-procurement-construction (EPC) projects. The theoretical model was validated and the effects of critical factors on stakeholder decision making were discussed using case study and numerical simulation analysis. The results show that (1) the choice of the BIM application strategy in EPC projects is affected by the interactive behavior of participants in the game, (2) the reasonable subsidies contribute to the evolution of the ideal stable strategy, (3) the owners’ high standard of incentives for general contractors can accelerate BIM promotion, (4) the general contractors are more sensitive to the loss that may be caused by problems with the BIM application, and (5) the positive externalities generated by the application of BIM have a great impact on the wide application of BIM. And some suggestions are put forward toward improving the development of BIM in EPC projects on the basis of findings. This study may contribute to our current understanding of the interactions of stakeholders in EPC projects, as well as provide valuable management implications for the governments in order to promote the development of BIM.
Sun et al. (Mon,) studied this question.