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This article considers recent developments in Australia–Japan security and defence ties and their trilateral dimension with the United States. I argue that the security links bilaterally and through their main ally the US have scope for development while the three nations share perceptions of security and strategic matters. However, there are elements of inherent unpredictability that may come into play to hinder the move towards a further strengthening of the current trilateral security arrangement. Possible impediments come from both external and internal sources making it difficult for the three nations to transform their trilateral security relations into an institution, alliance or treaty that formally links the three partners strategically.Footnote1 Notes 1. This is a revised and updated version of a paper presented at a workshop held at the Australian National University on 31 July 2006. The author would like to thank Bill Tow, Andrew MacIntyre, David Walton and an anonymous reviewer for their constructive comments on an earlier draft of the paper. However, the normal academic caveat applies. 2. While this was the first time since the Pacific War that the ‘spokes’ began to coordinate their defence and security interests through the US hub, during the First World War, Australia and Japan conducted a few shared activities based on their relationship with Britain. For example, the naval vessel, the Ibuki, escorted Australian forces bound for Egypt. Japan then had a strategic alliance with Britain and Australia was part of the British imperial outreach, such that Australia and Japan as ‘spokes’ formed links with each other through their British ‘hub’. 3. The Australian Secretary of the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, the US Deputy Secretary of State and the Japanese Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs conducted the official talks, while Australia's Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade, the US Secretary of State and Japan's Foreign Minister conducted the ministerial talks. 4. Of all major regional powers, Japan has been the most critical of North Korea's missile testings on 5 July 2006. Koizumi's visit to the Yasukuni Shrine on 15 August 2006 sent another strong message of his defiance of Beijing and Seoul's reactions. 5. One of the greatest rewards that the Howard government has received from Washington for its loyalty is the signing of a bilateral free trade agreement. 6. An eminent Singaporean analyst of regional affairs based at a premier think tank in a communication with the author mentioned that there has been little attention given to the ‘Washington–Tokyo–Canberra axis’. He added, ‘Australia is really a non-strategic player despite its role in the five-power defense pact. It is seen as a supporter of the US. Period.’ Email communication, 3 August 2006. 7. Japan's Ambassador to India, Mr Yasukuni Enoki, raised this prospect in 2004. The Hindu, 31 March 2004.
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Purnendra Jain (2006) studied this question.
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