Designing Incentive Mechanisms for Dual Moral Hazard Governance in Accident Prevention Services of China's Work Safety Liability Insurance

Leveraging accident prevention services under work safety liability insurance (WSLI) is a critical approach to safeguarding workplace safety in high‐risk industries. However, information asymmetry in this system tends to trigger moral hazards among multiple agents, undermining service effectiveness. This paper integrates principal‐agent theory with reputation theory to construct a dual principal‐agent model between government emergency management departments and insurance institutions, as well as between insurance institutions and third‐party service agencies. By introducing a reputation effect mechanism, it explores incentive mechanism design for mitigating dual moral hazards in accident prevention services under WSLI. Research findings indicate: Driven by reputation, third‐party service agencies proactively enhance service quality improvement efforts; Insurance institutions exhibit incentive levels with a critical threshold, negatively correlated with the reputation influence coefficient of third‐party service agencies and positively correlated with their own reputation influence coefficient; as reputation effects increase, local emergency management departments can appropriately reduce direct economic incentives. This research provides theoretical foundations and decision‐making references for government emergency management departments to efficiently guide WSLI in safeguarding workplace safety for enterprises in high‐risk industries.