Rationalizing Revolutionary Ideology

Revolution is viewed as a two person game, between Lenin and the Tsar, who compete for support of coalitions of the population. The payoff is the probability of revolution, which Lenin seeks to maximize and the Tsar to minimize. Lenin's strategies are income distribution proposals; the Tsar's strategies are lists of penalties which members of the population will pay should they join Lenin and their bid for revolution fail. The probabilities of revolution depend on the strategies which the two revolutionary entrepreneurs propose. There is an equilibrium pair of strategies; the task is to study what properties it has. In particular, it is shown that various tyrannical aspects of the Tsar's strategy, and progressive aspects of Lenin's strategy need not flow from ideological precommitments, but are simply good optimizing behavior, given their respective goals in this game. Thus apparently ideological positions of Lenin and the Tsar are provided with microfoundations of a sort. The paper thus aims to: (i) study revolutions as strategic games, and more generally to (ii) be a case study of the rational evolution of apparently ideological behavior. 1. INTROI)UCTION REVOLUTIONS HAVE BEEN VIEWED by social scientists and historians, for the most part, as largely inexplicable events. According to the logic of collective (Olson 4) the free rider problem should prevent each participant from joining in a revolutionary struggle. The side payments which might overcome such self-interested behavior are generally not offered in revolutionary situations. Rosa Luxemburg wrote of the psychology of the mass strike which made revolutionary events possible (Luxemburg 2): contemporary students of rational action might characterize that psychology as the adoption, by the participants, of assurance game in contrast to prisoner dilemma game (Sen 7). In the assurance game, an agent would rather cooperate (in this case revolt) if others do, rather than take a free ride. Economists, when they consider revolutions at all, view them as exogenous events, perhaps because they are so difficult to explain from rational self-interested behavior. Sociologists and political scientists have described which classes tend to be revolutionary (as opposed to reformist) in historical situations (for instance, Paige 6), Skocpol 8, Stinchcombe 9); these works show that any understanding of the formation of revolutionary preferences must be deeply rooted in the specifics of how the people involved earn their livelihood and how they interact. The present paper does not study these sociological aspects of the revolutionary situation; indeed, the sociology is taken as given and is embedded in various probability functions which are postulated. Nor do different production classes exist here, in the sense of groups of agents relating differently to the means of production. (I will, however, refer to different income classes in the paper.) Revolution is treated here as an allocation problem, a redistribution problem. The key actors upon whom attention will be focused are not the masses of people,