Transitions without consolidation: Democratization in six African cases

historical conditions doom democratic experiments in that region.' Certainly, democrats there face formidable long-term structural hindrances: the low level of economic development and the accompanying high levels of poverty and illiteracy; the failure of many new democracies to reverse the economic decline of the 1980s and generate rising prosperity in the 1990s; and deep ethnic or communal cleavages which undermine mutual trust. Some historical legacies also impede democratisation. Scholars differ on the question of whether precolonial political traditions are conducive to modem democratic institutions.2 Regardless, two other legacies appear quite burdensome. The first is the limited experience of multiparty democracy on which the new democracies can build, though the extent of such experience varies widely. And the second is the prevalence of personalism, clientelism and corruption in the preceding authoritarian regimes (if not much earlier), and the tendency for these stratagems to surface anew to undermine the institutionalisation of democratic norms and procedures.3 Finally, a contradition inherent in the widely pursued structural adjustment programmes further bedevils democratic experiments. Adjustment policies exact a high price from precisely those organised urban groups-university students, professionals, civil servants and workers-who usually formed the core of the pro-democracy movements. As these influential early supporters of democracy experience a deterioration rather than an improvement in their living standards, they become disillusioned with politicians and democracy itself. Cynicism and protest soon encumber the new democracies. Although these are indeed onerous conditions, their impact on democratisation requires some clarification. They do not prevent a transition to democracy by means of a reasonably 'free and fair' electoral contest. Such a contest can be successfully arranged even in a poor underdeveloped country suffering from ethnic/regional tensions, rampant clientelism and limited democratic experience. There are two requirements: that domestic and external forces compel recalcitrant autocrats to accept political reform; and that donors provide the resources and electoral technology to run a national election. Democratic transitions respond, in a sense, to a 'technical fix'. But democratisation, when it occurs in a hostile environment, tends to stall at this stage. The 'second transition' that