Institutional Overlap in Global Governance and the Design of Intergovernmental Organizations

Abstract How does the increasingly dense network of overlapping institutions in global governance affect the design of intergovernmental organizations (IGOs)? We argue that institutional overlap can unleash mimicking dynamics whereby states design new IGOs using the design of existing organizations that engage in similar issue areas and perform similar governance tasks for similar member states as templates. Using design templates from the reference group of overlapping institutions is a strategy for boundedly rational designers in situations of complexity because it reduces uncertainty and lowers the costs of identifying suitable institutional solutions. Overlap therefore increases the design similarity between new and pre-existing IGOs, specifically where pre-existing organizations have institutional designs that made them endure. Introducing a new measure of institutional overlap in global governance and new data on the design and governance tasks of the 534 IGOs from the Correlates of War Project, we corroborate our argument using regression analyses. Our results hold important lessons for theories of institutional design, regime complexity, and global governance more broadly.