The adaptation of the electoral system to the ethno-linguistic evolution of Belgian consociationalism

Complying with the idea that institutions could be used “to manage conflict democratically in divided societies” (Belmont et al., 2002 Belmont, K., Mainwaring, S. and Reynolds, A. 2002. “Institutional design, conflict management, and democracy”. In The Architecture of Democracy: Institutional Design, Conflict Management, and Democracy, Edited by: Reynolds, A. 1–11. Oxford: Oxford University Press. [Google Scholar], p. 3), the Belgian state has reformed its institutions in the past 40 years to accommodate ethno-linguistic tensions between Dutch-speakers and French-speakers. While less frequently mentioned, electoral rules have also been adapted to this ‘ethnicization’ of Belgian politics. Interestingly, changes made to the electoral system for managing tensions between the two linguistic communities followed the core principles of consociationalism. This observation supports the idea that, when an existing pattern of conflict resolution has existed in a country for decades, it tends to remain the guiding line to accommodate tensions even when new types of conflicts emerge.