Responses to Bernard Berofsky, John Martin Fischer and Galen Strawson

Berofsky's book Determinism (1971) had a considerable influence on me when I first began thinking about free will. It defended a sophisticated compatibilist position that I neither accept nor easily dismiss (a position developed further in Freedom from Necessity (1987) and sketched near the end of his present paper). Though Berofsky is a he has always been critical of many standard compatibilist arguments and positions, including conditional analyses of could have done otherwise, hierarchical versions of compatibilism and other views mentioned at the beginning of his paper. Thus, he is sympathetic to many criticisms I make of compatibilist views in chapters 3-5, without being ready to abandon his compatibilist commitments altogether. Berofsky correctly notes that much of importance to human can be nailed down before we raise the issue of power or ultimate origination that concerns incompatibilists like myself. A compatibilist, he says, need not designate an exercise of will as free until a great deal is in place. For he may demand conditions such as the absence of coercion or unusual duress, relevant information, a capacity for rational deliberation, higher-order reflectiveness, absence of pervasive.. .control by others, etc. I agree that such conditions are also needed for incompatibilist and that they are compatible with determinism. But I think these compatibilist conditions are only necessary for free will, not sufficient. I also concede to compatibilists like Berofsky that freedom is a term of many meanings, some of which may designate kinds of that are compatible with determinism. For this reason I argue (p. 14) that the usual textbook formulation of the Compatibility Question-Is compatible with determinism?-is too simple. The question should be Is in every significant sense worth wanting compatible with determinism? I think incompatibilists should simply concede to compatibilists, like Berofsky, that there are significant everyday freedoms-e.g., from coercion or