This study systematically explores the underlying mechanisms of collaborative innovation driving the green transformation of traditional energy enterprises. Existing research primarily focuses on enterprise scale and overall competitiveness, rarely delving into these specific collaborative pathways. Furthermore, studies employing evolutionary game theory to analyze the tripartite relationship among the government, traditional energy, and emerging technology enterprises remain fragmented, failing to fully capture the dynamic mechanisms of multi-stakeholder strategic choices. To bridge these gaps, this paper constructs a tripartite evolutionary game model incorporating coordination costs and the benefit distribution ratio to explore their influence mechanisms. Replicator dynamics equations are employed to identify stable cooperation conditions, overcoming traditional two-party framework constraints. Additionally, MATLAB R2024b numerical simulations validate the theoretical findings. The results reveal two evolutionarily stable equilibrium points. First, higher initial willingness among participants accelerates the system’s evolution toward a stable cooperative state. Second, coordination costs induced by information asymmetry act as a core bottleneck that deters participation and risks collaborative collapse. Third, targeted government incentives and a rational benefit distribution ratio directly determine cooperation willingness; notably, enterprises adopt collaborative strategies only when this ratio falls between 0.27 and 0.69. Fourth, fair and transparent supervision is crucial for mitigating trust deficits and distribution disputes. Ultimately, scientifically designing incentives, optimizing benefit structures, promoting information sharing, and establishing robust supervision effectively facilitate a sustainable tripartite collaborative innovation pattern.
Su et al. (Wed,) studied this question.