Bureaucratic Restructuring and the State-led (De-)Financialization of Local Governance in China

Abstract State-led financialization has emerged as a salient feature of local governance in China, yet it remains underexplored through the lens of bureaucratic restructuring. This paper traces the evolution of local financial agencies since 2002 through four distinct stages: local financial offices ( jinrongban ), financial bureaus ( jinrongju ), financial regulatory bureaus ( jinrong jianguanju ) and financial commissions ( jinrongwei ). Initially, local governments established jinrongban to harness financial capital for regional development. By proactively connecting local firms with capital markets to facilitate corporate listings, they embedded financial logic into local governance, reflecting local state-led financialization. Subsequently, the central government formalized these bodies into jinrongju with expanded mandates, deepening state-led financialization. Later, it systematically devolved regulatory responsibilities and renamed them jinrong jianguanju , elevating regulatory functions to a top priority, illustrating how the central government selectively steered the direction of financialization. Ultimately, provincial agencies were reorganized into jinrongwei and stripped of development functions, while city-level counterparts were largely closed, signifying a shift towards central state-led de-financialization. This trajectory was driven by shifting central–local dynamics, as early bottom-up initiatives were superseded by top-down control. The bureaucratic restructuring examined in this study offers new insights into the state-led (de-)financialization of local governance in China.