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This paper proposes a combinatorial auction approach for multi-resource allocation of an energy storage (ES) shared by multiple electricity end users in a residential community. Through the auction, a user buys a group of ES resources, including capacity, energy, charging power, and discharging power, from the ES operator. With the ES resources, users store grid energy during low-electricity-price hours, so that they can consume the cheap stored energy during high-electricity-price hours to reduce their electricity bills. In the auction, users submit their resource demands and corresponding bid prices, based on which the ES operator determines the winners and the final payments that the winners must pay. To solve the NP-hard winner determination problem, a fully polynomial time approximation scheme (FPTAS) is developed, which can optimize social welfare but may violate resource supply constraints. To deal with the constraint violation, the ES operator may buy extra energy outside the system to meet the winners' actual demands. Further, a distributed implementation of the auction is designed to offload the auction computation onto the users while preventing the users from manipulating the auction outcomes in the course of computation. The proposed distributed auction can ensure that all users faithfully complete the assigned computation tasks in an ex-post Nash equilibrium. A real time-of-use (TOU) electricity tariff and actual home load data are used in the simulation, in which the proposed auction approach is evaluated in terms of social welfare and computational efficiency.
Zhong et al. (Wed,) studied this question.