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Groups often agree that change is needed, but differing preferences and information may still lead to difficulty coordinating on a particular alternative. In a laboratory experiment, we study coordination and information aggregation in a divided-majority voting game with public information and conflicting preferences. Voters observe private signals and a public signal about whether alternative upper A A A or upper B B B is socially optimal. Unless sufficiently many voters agree, an inferior default upper C C C occurs. When the public signal is more accurate than the private signal and voters have common preferences, most voters coordinate on the public signal. However, when public-signal accuracy is reduced or preferences conflict, voters follow the public signal less frequently. While reduced public-signal accuracy substantially increases the frequency of coordination failure, conflicting preferences between subgroups do not. These results highlight the importance of accurate public information in achieving collective action.
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Cox et al. (2026) studied this question.
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