Summaries

7–35The Ideology Trap: China and the Limits of Cold War AnalogiesEun A Jo, William & Mary, and Jessica Chen Weiss, Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International StudiesWhat role do ideological differences play in great power relations? Existing studies often treat ideological differences as fixed variables that exacerbate frictions between great powers. Instead, we treat ideologies as dynamic systems of ideas that evolve through domestic contestation and international adaptation. Our framework separates ideological content—whether states believe that their ideology is universally applicable—from the scope of ideological promotion—to what extent states seek to promote their ideology abroad. Specifically, our typology distinguishes between ideological strategies that are universalist or particularist in content, and expansive or selective in their scope of promotion. We use this framework to show how states can shift strategies over time without altering their underlying ideological commitments. We apply this framework to the Soviet Union under Joseph Stalin and Leonid Brezhnev and to China under Deng Xiaoping and Xi Jinping. Our case studies show that there was no single Cold War, and that contemporary China differs in important ways from the Soviet Union.36–73Competition Under the Security DilemmaSebastian Rosato, University of Notre DameThe security dilemma is one of the most famous concepts in international politics. Yet questions remain about its causes and consequences. Specifically: How often are great powers under the security dilemma? How do they behave when they are under the security dilemma? This article offers a structural realist theory of the security dilemma to answer these questions. The central argument is that great powers are always under the security dilemma, and this almost invariably causes them to compete with one another more or less intensely for the means to security. This understanding is in stark contrast to the conventional view, captured by offense-defense theory, which finds that there are various conditions under which great powers can escape from under the security dilemma or cooperate in spite of it. An analysis of the logic of the two theories and a review of the historical record from 1871 to 1990 demonstrate that structural realism offers a better understanding of the security dilemma than offense-defense theory.74–127Escalate to Survive? Nuclear First Use in Contemporary Great Power ConflictFiona S. Cunningham, University of Pennsylvania, and Kristin Ven Bruusgaard, Norwegian Intelligence SchoolWhy do great powers believe it is necessary to have nuclear first-use options? What explains the different types of first-use options in the nuclear force postures of Russia and the United States? Why did China not develop a first-use option in the post-Cold War era? Existing literature focuses on whether great power nuclear strategies should entrench mutually assured destruction or compete for superiority, but it does not fully explain variation in first-use options. We compare the approaches to first use in the nuclear strategies of China, Russia, and the United States. Each of these great powers has different plans for both pursuing limited conflict objectives and countering conventional and geographic vulnerabilities, regime threats, and threats to allies, as well as different beliefs about damage limitation. Acute conventional and geographic vulnerabilities explain Russia's first-use options, which are optimized for state survival. Despite speculation that China might use nuclear weapons first to compel reunification with Taiwan, China has weak reasons to do so because it prefers non-nuclear means to achieve this objective. In contrast, the United States maintains options for first use, largely because of its extended deterrence commitments to allies and beliefs about damage limitation. These different approaches could fuel nuclear escalation in a conflict scenario.128–175The Cost of Restraint: India's Divergent Responses to China and Pakistan as Nuclear RivalsYogesh Joshi, University of Central Florida, and Rohan Mukherjee, London School of Economics and Political ScienceSince the United States and the Soviet Union acquired the bomb in the 1940s, the common wisdom has been that each new proliferator would trigger its regional rivals and competitors to follow suit. Yet the incidence of such reactive proliferation is low. Scholars typically attribute this gap between expectation and reality to resource constraints and potential backlash from powerful allies and adversaries. These factors, however, only focus on the cost of nuclear pursuit. We focus on the other side of the equation, the cost of nuclear restraint or not pursuing the bomb, which derives from a state's assessments of the degree of nuclear threat that a rival poses. States are most likely to reactively proliferate when a proliferating rival has extensive aims and inferior conventional capabilities, factors that combine to make nuclear restraint costlier than pursuing the bomb. We demonstrate this theoretical insight's validity using interviews and new archival evidence pertaining to India's divergent assessments of China and Pakistan as nuclear threats. Our findings address the long-standing puzzle of why India did not pursue nuclear weapons in response to China's rapid nuclearization in the 1960s but acquired them in the late 1980s in response to Pakistan's acquisition.176–231Blockade by Fire: China's Potential to Blockade Taiwan Using Missile Attacks on PortsKerby Davis and Eugene Gholz, both of the University of Notre DameThe possibility that China might use military force to try to reunify with Taiwan increasingly worries analysts, especially as China expands its military investments and the political relationship between China and Taiwan deteriorates. Much of the military analysis of the relationship focuses on invasion scenarios, but some analysts suggest that a blockade is a less risky way for China to compel Taiwan to capitulate. This article points out some undesirable features of a traditional blockade in which China tries to interdict shipping approaching Taiwan, particularly by deploying a surface fleet and submarines. We built a Monte Carlo simulation model of an alternative Chinese concept of blockade operations using standoff missile strikes on ports to diminish cargo throughput to Taiwan. The military campaign analysis results suggest that China likely can substantially suppress Taiwan's trade, at relatively low escalation risk, without depleting China's scarce and expensive fleet. We discuss reasons why even militarily successful blockades have rarely achieved all their political goals, and we offer suggestions for Taiwan to build resilience and thereby reduce the probability of this potentially militarily effective concept of blockade operations.International Security is a peer-reviewed quarterly journal edited at the Harvard Kennedy School's Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs and published by the MIT Press. The journal offers a combination of professional and policy-relevant articles that strives to contribute to the analysis of contemporary, historical, and theoretical questions in security studies. International Security welcomes submissions on all aspects of security affairs and aims to provide timely analyses of contemporary security issues through contributions that reflect diverse points of view and varied professional experiences.The articles published in the journal are first circulated for doubly blind external review. To facilitate review, we ask authors to please submit their manuscripts with a cover letter and an abstract of 150–200 words online via Editorial Manager at https://www.editorialmanager.com/isec. Authors should refrain from identifying themselves in their manuscripts. A length of 8,00015,000 words is appropriate, but the journal will consider and publish longer manuscripts. Authors of manuscripts with more than 18,000 words should consult the journal's editors before submission.For a fuller explanation of the submission guidelines and the review process, current contents, a cumulative index, and other useful information, please visit the journal's website at https://www.belfercenter.org/collection/international-security. For information on subscriptions, permissions, and other details, visit the MIT Press International Security website at https://direct.mit.edu/isec. For more information on the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, the editorial headquarters of International Security, go to https://www.belfercenter.org/.