The revelation that Iraq had spent as much as $8 billion on its calutron program implies that Iraq sought to develop a large and renewable weapons material stockpile. While the calutron revelations are alarming, a nuclear weapons program requires more than equipment to produce fissile materials. Iraq lacked the hands-on experience required to nudge its fledgling gas centrifuge program out of the laboratory and into the large-scale production phase. No information to date suggests that Iraq would have escaped serious difficulties as it moved from a calutron pilot stage to large-scale production of highly enriched uranium. The revelations have raised hard questions about the quality of reconnaissance information on Iraq's nuclear effort. But the heat fingerprints left by a large calutron production plant would become visible only after the facility was producing enriched uranium. Tracking down and eliminating Iraq's nuclear weapons capabilities under the terms of Resolution 687, and a continued embargo to halt imports of relevant technologies and equipment, will be the most effective way to prevent Iraq's nuclear program from resurfacing.
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Albright et al. (1991) studied this question.
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