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Conceptual exploration of Tarski's views on colloquial language, highlighting implications for truth claims.
Tarski's characteristics of colloquial language (CL) give rise to a sceptical mode. The mode posits that it is not possible to ascribe a logical value to CL sentences. The text identifies two standard interpretations of Tarski’s mode: the optimistic view asserts that it is merely an inconsequential mistake; and the pessimistic view, which suggests that Tarski recognized the inherent limitations of everyday language and shifted his focus to metamathematics. In contrast, I put forward an interpretation which argues that Tarski’s mode represents a critical, though unsystematic, elaboration of the CL properties (such as universality, inconsistency, and pseudo non-monocinity). These properties render it impossible to define truth for CL. Consequently, all philosophical claims in CL remain beyond the scope of truth and falsehood.
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Witold Marzęda (2026) studied this question.
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