Could NATO Replace the Guarantee System in a Cyprus Settlement?

This article examines whether a NATO-based collective security framework could replace the 1960 Guarantee System and strengthen the viability of a comprehensive settlement to the Cyprus question. Drawing on historical, legal and political analysis, it claims that the existing system has repeatedly failed to prevent crises, manage escalation or balance the asymmetry of power between the parties. The study assesses the legal and institutional parameters of the EU and NATO, the strategic environment of the Eastern Mediterranean, and the extent to which a multilateral security arrangement embedded in NATO could provide a credible and enforceable alternative option. The analysis suggests that a NATO-based model, linked to the EU’s institutional framework, offers a more coherent mechanism for balancing interests, mitigating risks and ensuring long-term stability. In this regard, the article contributes to the existing literature by evaluating a security option that has not been systematically explored, integrating legal reasoning with the strategic realities of the region and the operational logic of Euro-Atlantic institutions.