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This randomized trial illustrates the beneficiaries-compensate scheme's efficiency in environmental regulation, indicating a shift in compensation strategy.
In many environmental problems, emissions are hard to monitor and abatement costs are privately known. We study how efficient abatement nevertheless can be induced through market‐like arrangements that condition transfers on verifiable abatement rather than on measured emissions. We characterize the transfer schemes that implement efficient abatement in unique dominant strategies and show that a single scheme, the beneficiaries‐compensate transfer scheme, emerges under two distinct characterizations: one based on equilibrium properties and one grounded in classical fairness axioms. Under the beneficiaries‐compensate transfer scheme, each agent compensates others according to the benefits received from their abatement. We illustrate its usefulness in two applications.
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Gudmundsson et al. (2026) studied this question.
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