Answers are grounded in this paper and cite their sources.
Informational asymmetries between employers may inhibit optimal worker mobility. However, researchers rarely observe shocks to employers’ information. I exploit two school districts’ adoptions of value-added (VA) measures of teacher effectiveness—informational shocks to some, but not all, employers—to provide direct tests of asymmetric employer learning. I develop a learning model and test its predictions for teacher mobility. I find that adopting VA increases within-district mobility of high-VA teachers, while low-VA teachers move out of district to uninformed principals. These patterns are consistent with asymmetric employer learning. This sorting from widespread VA adoption exacerbates inequality in access to effective teaching.
No takes yet. Share an insight, caveat, or question.
Michael D. Bates (2019) studied this question.
Synapse has enriched 10 related papers. Consider them for comparative context: