Magnifica Humanitas marks a significant shift in the moral and social understanding of artificial intelligence. While Antiqua et nova had established a necessary anthropological distinction between human intelligence and artificial intelligence, Magnifica Humanitas places AI within the broader horizon of the social question: work, truth, freedom, war, communication, education, democratic life, and the common good. This positioning paper argues that the encyclical's images of Babel and Nehemiah offer a powerful framework for understanding the two possible trajectories of AI. Babel represents the concentration of cognitive power: the risk that artificial intelligence may become an opaque infrastructure through which a few economic, technical, or political actors control the conditions of interpretation, decision, and public discourse. Nehemiah, by contrast, suggests a distributed reconstruction of responsibility: a civic and educational work through which communities, schools, universities, associations, journalists, researchers, and intermediate bodies each assume their "portion of the wall" in rebuilding critical capacity. The paper introduces the concept of cognitive subsidiarity as a necessary development of the principle of subsidiarity in the age of AI. Cognitive subsidiarity means creating the conditions for citizens and civil society to exercise critical, documentary, and deliberative capacities without being crushed by the informational asymmetry of large public and private systems. It is not digital paternalism, nor merely AI literacy. It is a democratic infrastructure of verification, responsibility, and judgment. Within this framework, AI should not be conceived primarily as a convenience, a delegation of thought, or a substitute for human judgment. Used within disciplined civic practices, it can become a discipline of engagement: a tool that helps transform indignation into verification, suspicion into testable questions, complexity into accountable public reasoning, and civic passion into responsible action. The paper therefore proposes that the Church's most important contribution in the age of AI is not the creation of a confessional technology or a "Catholic AI," but the articulation of a public moral grammar capable of orienting new social practices: dignity of the person, truth as responsibility, human control, correction of error, care for the vulnerable, non-violent communication, solidarity, subsidiarity, and the common good. The central question is not whether AI should be accepted or rejected. It is what form of humanity we intend to practice through AI: a humanity that delegates judgment to the machine, or a more demanding humanity that uses the machine to make its own work of understanding, verification, deliberation, and responsibility more rigorous.
Luca Cinacchio (Mon,) studied this question.