This theoretical model explains the emergence of consciousness and self from interpretative processes, suggesting new directions for understanding cognitive phenomena.
Most theories of consciousness begin their analysis from an already-existing subject. The present work proposes an alternative architecture in which the observer is not a precondition of consciousness but its result. The central claim is that consciousness constitutes a multi-level interpretative architecture whose primary element is the Unit of Meaning (UM) — a functionally minimal interpretative operation within which no active competition among alternative interpretations is present. Units of Meaning combine into interpretations; interpretations compete within an interpretative cohort; competition is resolved through inhibition of alternatives; the dominant interpretation is stabilised by Dominanta X — a functional principle of temporary interpretative stabilisation, which does not select, compete, or decide, but exclusively stabilises the already-dominant interpretation; the stabilised result is internally presented to the system as an Observer event; and the accumulation of Observer events through memory constitutes the Self as a historical identity structure. The model introduces five quantitative parameters (Interpretative Breadth, Interpretative Density, Observer Stability, Self Stability, Memory Integration Index), generates six falsifiable empirical predictions, offers a structured clinical analysis of conditions from Alzheimer's disease to schizophrenia, and is systematically positioned relative to Global Workspace Theory, Integrated Information Theory, Predictive Processing, and Active Inference. The central philosophical contribution is the reversal of the traditional direction of explanation: rather than explaining interpretation through the subject, the present model explains the subject through interpretation. The work is positioned as the foundational ontological layer of the ICE–Dominanta X system, providing the basis for subsequent theories of interpretative efficiency, cognitive freedom, and neuroethical development.
No takes yet. Share an insight, caveat, or question.
Igor Kaminskyi (2026) studied this question.
Synapse has enriched 5 closely related papers on similar clinical questions. Consider them for comparative context: