Abstract Purpose: This study aims to synthesise and critically evaluate the existing body of empirical research on the role of institutional investors as corporate monitors, examining how institutional ownership influences governance outcomes, agency costs, and firm performance in both developed and emerging markets, with particular attention to the Indian context. Methodology: The review followed the PRISMA guideline and conducted a comprehensive review across various databases from an initial identification of 80 papers after screening and eligibility assessment (inclusion and exclusion criteria), 54 studies published between 2000 to 2025 were included in the final synthesis. Analysis was employed to identify patterns, contradictions and research gaps across the literature findings. Findings: The synthesis reveals that institutional investors serve as effective corporate monitors, significantly reducing agency costs and improving governance outcomes. However, monitoring effectiveness varies systematically by investor type pressure sensitive institution (Mutual Funds, pension funds) prove more effective than pressure-sensitive institutions (banks, insurance companies) that face business relationship conflicts. The influence threshold effect indicates that institutional influence strengthens beyond critical ownership levels. Foreign institutional investors emerge as a distinctive category, reacting faster to information, bringing context-specific experience, and disproportionately targeting family firms, though their feedback trading can destabilise markets. Originality/Implication: The study offers the first systematic synthesis of evidence on institutional investors as corporate monitors with a specific focus on emerging markets, particularly India, integrating 54 studies. The findings provide actionable guidance for Investors, industrialists, researchers, academic bodies, policy maker to design regulations, policies, etc.
Soni et al. (Wed,) studied this question.