From Mine-Port Integration to Terminal Governance: Simulating Transaction Costs in Mining and Bulk Shipping Projects

This article extends “Simulating Economics for Mining and Shipping Projects using Transaction Cost Economics” by moving from mine-port integration to terminal-access governance. The upstream article used Myra Falls Mine / Discovery Terminal and Orca Quarry as examples of integrated mine-port systems and developed a toy model of mining, processing, and shipping to compare project designs by private profit, Canadian GDP impact, and strategic reliability. This extension preserves that framework but adds a governance layer. It argues that port access should not be modeled only as a flat per-tonne transport charge. Terminal governance changes whether shipping infrastructure is economically usable. The article compares three terminal-access governance forms: integrated mine-port ownership, contracted terminal access, and common-user or spot-access exposure. The paper introduces a governance-adjusted project-value expression that separates direct transport cost from transaction cost and expected disruption loss. Westshore Terminals / BHP Jansen potash is used as an illustrative contracted-terminal-access case, not as an investment case. The bounded claim is that terminal governance should be modeled explicitly when port access is material to mining-project value. Bulk terminals are not passive logistics inputs. They are economic governance institutions.