Between Phenomenology and Realism The Problem of Givenness in Jocelyn Benoist

In Jocelyn Benoist’s work, phenomenology occupies a central place, serving as the foundation of his philosophical investigations and, ultimately, of his most current theoretical propositions and criticisms. It is curious that phenomenology gradually changes within his thought without ever ceasing to occupy a central place in it. From methodological principle, it becomes a quite strong target of their criticisms. In this paper, we will reconstruct these criticisms that, on one hand, demonstrate the fertility that phenomenology has in philosophy and, on the other hand, the resistance it offers to continue the investigations of the relation between perception and reality (on what we called the Benoist vicious circle of intentionality). While Benoist questions phenomenology in its conceptual framework, it is phenomenology that imposes a very arduous challenge to the philosopher so that he may, after all, understand our relationship with the world in other terms, so important and renewed to him.