This article proposes reforms to withdrawal clauses to enhance climate governance resilience, suggesting practical changes for future agreements.
Amid escalating climate crisis, multilateralism and climate treaties remain the foundation of global climate governance. Yet, Canada's withdrawal from the Kyoto Protocol, the US's two withdrawals from the Paris Agreement and its more recent withdrawal from the UNFCCC reveal a deep structural vulnerability: The formulaic design of withdrawal clauses has failed to evolve with contemporary political and normative realities, thereby undermining institutional resilience. This article attempts to re‐examine withdrawal provisions through textual analysis, case studies of State withdrawals and assessment of their overt and latent consequences. It argues for reforming withdrawal clauses within the climate regime to reinforce trust, prevent normative regression and sustain collective climate ambition. This article further proposes several potential reform paths and assesses their feasibility from two dimensions: substantive design, including deletion of exit clauses, extension of waiting and notice periods and imposition of justification requirements, and institutional incorporation, encompassing amendment of existing agreements, negotiation of new ones or reform through soft‐law instruments. The aim of reform is not to abolish the right of withdrawal but redefine it as a regulated, accountable and reviewable process, one that strengthens both the ambition and legal resilience of global climate governance.
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Wenlong Zheng (2026) studied this question.
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