From Subjectivism and Pure Objectivism to Conditional Objectivism: A Criticism and Revision of Richard Arneson’s Theory of Welfare

Richard J. Arneson’s theory of welfare underwent a significant transformation from subjectivism to objectivism. Three difficulties—adaptive preferences, false beliefs, and non-prudential desires—demonstrate that a welfare theory grounded in subjective attitudes is untenable in principle, driving Arneson toward an objective list theory. Through his rejection of the endorsement constraint, he established a purely objectivist position: subjective attitudes are “neither necessary nor sufficient” for well-being. This position generates significant justificatory pressure toward hard paternalism. Arneson confronted this consequence by arguing that hard paternalism is defensible in principle, while contending that paternalistic intervention must remain restrained in practice on grounds of the intrinsic value of autonomy, the limitations of state capacity, and the costs of stigmatization. However, the reasons Arneson offers for restraint cannot be adequately supported by the objective list alone; they face explanatory pressure at the level of political application. Conditional objectivism can better fill this explanatory gap: for an item on the objective list to count as contributing to a particular individual’s well-being, a negative condition must be satisfied—namely, that the individual would not rationally reject the item under conditions of reflective deliberation.