On progress in science and metaphysics

In a recent paper, Kerry McKenzie identifies theory change in science as a source for doubts about the value of engaging in metaphysics of science before a final theory is at hand. According to McKenzie, the basic problem is that naturalistically-inclined metaphysics lacks a concept of progress. More specifically, naturalistically-inclined metaphysics lacks a concept of progress as approximation that can easily be taken to correspond to the scientific sources of metaphysical inquiry. In this paper we criticise progress as approximation as too narrow a concept, notably, even in science. Instead, we propose an alternative notion of scientific progress that metaphysical investigations can and do latch on to, namely progress understood as exploring and constraining theory space. This understanding of progress draws on common practice in particle physics, translates nicely to metaphysics, and leads to a convincing reply to McKenzie’s argument, as we shall argue. Furthermore, our proposal speaks in favour of a more lenient version of naturalistically-inclined metaphysics, namely inductive metaphysics.