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Quasi-experiment reveals cuts in executive pay increase resignations in state-owned enterprises, impacting performance.
We take the implementation of the Xianxinling (literally ‘constraining compensation’ in Chinese; hereafter ‘XXL’) regulation in 2015 as a quasi‐experiment to examine the effect of executive compensation cuts on managerial turnover and subsequent firm performance in centrally administered state‐owned enterprises (CSOEs) in China. Using a difference‐in‐differences research design, we find that following the implementation of the XXL regulation, managers of regulation‐affected firms (treatment firms, hereafter) are more likely to resign. Further analyses reveal that the impact of the implementation of the XXL regulation on treatment firms' managerial resignation is particularly pronounced for managers who have higher ability, have more outside opportunities and experience greater pay cuts. In addition, we find that managerial resignations lead to poorer firm performance in treated firms, suggesting that the XXL regulation causes considerable brain drain from CSOEs.
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Yang et al. (2026) studied this question.
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