Demonstrates enhanced data security in IoT devices, implying resistance to white-box cloning attacks.
Internet of Things (IoT) devices in exposed environments face white-box attacks such as key extraction and code cloning. This paper introduces PUFBind, a cryptographic system for clouddevice architectures that binds decryption to a device’s physical unclonable function. By using the physical unclonable function response as a tweak in a tweakable encryption scheme, PUFBind ensures data confidentiality for the server and resists both key extraction and cloning attacks on the device. We provide formal security proofs for device binding resistance and evaluate a practical implementation, demonstrating efficient performance on typical IoT platforms while outperforming existing white-box encryption schemes.
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Liu et al. (2026) studied this question.
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