The British Interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine Versus Communist Militarism in the Mid-1920s (The Cases of Iran and Afghanistan)

The announcement by the American President James Monroe of a new foreign policy concept in his annual message to Congress on 2 December 1823 matured into a landmark event. For the UK, this declaration acquired particular significance after the end of the First World War and the Russian Revolution of 1917–22, when the existence of Pax Britannica was put under question. That is why some primarily Conservative statesmen and theoreticians attempted to reinterpret the doctrine using US historical experience through a lens of imperial defence during the initial stage of global industrialization. This article focuses on Iran and Afghanistan as typical examples of the confrontation between the British version of the Monroe Doctrine and the concept of ‘communist militarism’. Based on Russian and British archival records, as well as on the media commentaries and reminiscences by contemporary political observers, thus article demonstrates the fields of this conflict and the process of recalibration of both Soviet and British foreign policy influenced by real or imaginary threats as the Kremlin and Whitehall perceived them. In doing so, the article explores the nature and means of Soviet-British competition in the so-called ‘pacifist era’ of the mid-1920s, albeit refuting the viewpoint of the Great Game’s prolongation in any guise during this period.