Investigates profitability and investment incentives in DSOs under different regulatory models, suggesting essential alignment for digitalization goals.
The energy transition and increasing integration of renewables require smarter grid investment strategies, with digitalization offering a cost-effective alternative to traditional infrastructure reinforcement. However, existing regulatory frameworks often fail to provide appropriate economic signals to support asset-light, digital investments. This study investigates how different regulatory models shape distribution system operators’ profitability and investment incentives under alternative investment strategies. Using a system dynamics model applied to the Portuguese regulatory context, we compare a hybrid incentive framework combining rate of return on capital expenditures (CAPEX) and price-cap regulation on operational expenditures (OPEX) with a revenue-cap model based on total expenditure (TOTEX). Results show that the TOTEX framework strengthens cost-efficiency incentives and improves the relative attractiveness of digitalization, while discouraging CAPEX-intensive investment strategies. Conversely, the hybrid model favors conventional infrastructure investments through asset-based remuneration. Performance-based mechanisms are found to have a limited financial impact, contributing approximately 1% to overall profits. These findings highlight the importance of aligning regulatory incentives with digitalization objectives. The proposed system dynamics approach provides a systemic framework to support regulators in evaluating the interaction between regulatory design, investment behavior, and network performance.
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Monaco et al. (2026) studied this question.
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