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Model demonstrates demand for audit despite lack of regulatory requirement, influencing corporate decisions.
The article presents a simple model to explain the existence of demand by corporations for audit services even in the absence of a mandatory requirement by regulatory bodies to do so. If the additional price that the owner/manager of the corporation can get from a given ownership share (relative to what he/she could obtain had only an average quality been attributed to the manager) as a result of the auditor's attestation is higher than the auditor's fee, he/she will have an incentive to hire the auditor. There is a minimum manager quality, however, below which the manager would not want to hire an auditor. This is so because below a minimum quality level, the increment in price that the manager can get for the ownership share beyond what he/she would get, had an average quality been attributed to him/her, would be smaller than the audit fee.
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Moore et al. (1990) studied this question.
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