On the Nature and Definition of Stigma

Livingston and Boyd have rightly suggested that ‘conceptual clarity regarding “stigma” is lagging behind the burgeoning body of research regarding its effects’. This observation still seems valid. In this paper, we argue that existing definitions of stigma, most prominently that of Link and Phelan, rely on multiple overlapping criteria, potentially contributing to ambiguity and measurement difficulties. We analyze Link and Phelan’s definition and thereby indirectly other later definitions that build on the same components. We show that three of five constitutive components are redundant. We therefore propose that stigma consists of only the components that has shown non-redundant in our analysis—negative labeling maintained by power asymmetry. On that basis we outline 13 analytical dimensions of the phenomena of stigma to demonstrate that this stripped-down account can capture its’ complexity without the redundancies found in previous accounts. In closing, we discuss the implications of our proposal for efforts aimed at reducing stigma.