Coercion, Capital and State Death: Understanding Political Instability in the Confucian Context

This thesis departs from the premise that Charles Tilly's classic state formation theory "war made the state, and the state made war" is applicable to the East Asian experience. It investigates why military competition in East Asia culminated in a unified universal imperial order, in stark contrast to the fragmented nation-state system that emerged in Europe. This study identifies the unique perception of political instability within a Confucian context as the primary variable that drove this divergence in state formation mechanisms. According to the study's hypothesis, the Han Dynasty established a model of low-cost mobilization that created a powerful path dependency for subsequent East Asian states. Consequently, state survival in the region relied on low-cost ideological mobilization based on the imitation of Han-style Confucian legitimacy rather than high-cost physical coercion. Within this Confucian order, Tianxia (All Under Heaven) was conceptualized as an extension of the household, where imperial authority projected paternal power. As a result, the loss of Confucian legitimacy was perceived as an existential instability—an impending collapse of the low-cost mobilization system itself—rather than a mere political crisis. Furthermore, abandoning the goal of "unification" (the symbolic proof of familial stability in Tianxia) meant forfeiting the justification for this efficient mobilization system, compelling political actors to pursue a universal imperial order to avoid elimination by competitors. To empirically demonstrate this mechanism, this thesis analyzes 16th–17th century Joseon as a representative case. It examines how Joseon, as a peripheral state, secured political stability through political recognition from China (cefeng; 冊封) and utilized institutions such as seowon (academies) and hyang-yak (community compacts) to minimize governing costs based on that ideological legitimacy. Moreover, the research clarifies how the Imjin War paradoxically reinforced the imagination of a universal empire rather than triggering a transition to European-style sovereign statehood. During the conflict, Joseon defined its survival not as simple territorial defense, but as a sacred war to protect universal civilization. While this framing was effective for wartime mobilization, the perception of Tianxia as a family and China as its patriarch drove Joseon into an aggressive foreign policy toward the rising Qing hegemony. Ultimately, this ideological commitment delayed the formation of a modern nation-state and left a unique structural legacy inherent to East Asian nationalism. In conclusion, while acknowledging the universal law that war catalyzes state formation, this thesis demonstrates that the specific character of a state is fundamentally shaped by how its society defines order and instability.