Benefit distribution and investment decisions in complex product development networks: a biform game with Position value

Complex product development networks (CPDNs) are typically characterised by co-opetition relationships and restricted communication structures between manufacturers and suppliers. Traditional investment decision models often fail to capture these two inherent features simultaneously. To bridge this gap, this study proposes a novel biform game model that integrates the Position value from the graph cooperative game framework. In the non-cooperative stage, firms determine their investment levels. In the cooperative stage, collaborative benefits are allocated based on the Position value, which effectively reflects firms’ marginal contributions and their brokerage roles within the network topology. Furthermore, we explore the impact of key parameters on investment decisions and extend the model to networks with n suppliers to verify the robustness of our conclusions. The finding reveals that the optimal investments derived from the biform game model are higher than those from a pure non-cooperative model, underscoring the role of cooperation in incentivizing investment. This research presents a novel theoretical framework for analyzing strategic investment under co-opetition and communication constraints, offering practical insights to enhance investment efficiency and collaboration in CPDNs.