This model introduces independent commitments for governance aspects in cryptographic systems, indicating implications for security.
The Three Hash Rule introduces a governance-completeness model for cryptographic systems in which object state, admissibility, meaning, and optional jurisdictional locality are committed independently. The paper argues that content hashes, signatures, and provenance records are insufficient when treated as collapsed indicators of validity: a state may verify and still be inadmissible; a signature may verify and still lack standing; a text may persist and still change meaning. The framework defines independent commitments for state (H_s), admissibility (H_c), meaning (H_m), and locality (H_j), together with decision procedures and witness structures that make each governance question separately decidable. It further introduces receipt binding modes, canonicalization requirements, semantic normalization constraints, authority graphs, role-based distinctions between receipts, authority, and evidence, and a Constitutional Legend frame for projecting jurisdiction, binding, rendering, transport, continuity, and authority into verifiable governance architecture. The paper’s central claim is that governance completeness is not achieved by stronger signatures or richer content hashes, but by separating the constitutional questions that cryptographic artifacts are asked to answer.
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Adam Ableman Mazurk (2026) studied this question.
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