The argument from epistemic injustice for compulsory philosophical education in primary schools

In this article, I argue that philosophy must be taught mandatorily in primary education, in light of considerations about epistemic injustice. I maintain that denying primary school students access to philosophical education wrongs them as epistemic agents, by limiting their opportunities to develop intellectual resources required for justified reasoning about norms of belief, action and emotion. I hold that such limitations constitute a direct form of epistemic injustice in a broad sense, understood as damage to epistemically significant capacities. Moreover, I claim that these limitations increase vulnerability to narrower forms of epistemic injustice, including at least testimonial and hermeneutical injustice, by holding back the cultivation of cognitive virtues and critical thinking dispositions that function as safeguards against prejudicial, discriminatory and irrational belief-formation processes. I conclude that since epistemic injustice inflicts significant harm on individuals as epistemic subjects, educational policymakers ought to prevent it where possible and, thus, establish philosophy as a core component of primary school curriculum.