This article analyzes benchmarks in policymaking, highlighting their strategic use by consultants and implications for democracy.
In a post-dirigiste economy, French policymakers have come to rely heavily on private consultants, raising concerns about the privatization and democratic erosion of policymaking. To assess consultants’ influence, this article focuses on the role of benchmarks as key knowledge instruments through which consultants operate in policymaking. It analyzes the political economy of benchmarks in contemporary France, the social relations between producers and consumers of benchmarks, and the ways in which actors commission, produce, select, and strategically deploy benchmarks. Drawing on semi-structured interviews with benchmark producers in major consulting firms and public advisory bodies, as well as analysis of official reports, the article shows that publicly commissioned benchmarks often serve pre-defined political strategies, while non-commissioned rankings possess the affective power to shape public discourse by generating emotions around national emergencies, amplified by the media, that justify competitiveness-oriented agendas. Benchmarks rarely determine specific policy content; rather they reassure decision-makers, legitimize reforms, and facilitate responsibility-shifting. They are also ideological instruments in struggles over economic governance. Their indicators and comparative frameworks privilege neoliberal solutions aligned with the converging interests of senior civil servants and large corporations, but their influence ultimately depends on domestic actors who mobilize them to defend shared class positions.
No takes yet. Share an insight, caveat, or question.
Juliette Schwak (2026) studied this question.
Synapse has enriched 5 closely related papers on similar clinical questions. Consider them for comparative context: