Federated autocracy and the illusion of multiparty democracy in Nigeria: electoral authoritarianism in perspective

This paper examines the illusion of multiparty democracy in Nigeria through the lens of federated autocracy, a framework that explains how authoritarian practices are coordinated across different levels of government within a federal system. Drawing on theories of electoral and subnational authoritarianism and situated within global patterns of democratic backsliding, the study explores how Nigeria’s democratic institutions are systematically hollowed out while electoral rituals are maintained. Using data from key informant interviews, verified news reports, and official documents, it finds that both federal and state actors manipulate constitutional mechanisms to entrench elite dominance and sustain incumbency. It also underscores the role of subnational autocrats in reinforcing central control. Comparative insights from countries such as Russia, India, and Hungary strengthen the analysis. The paper contributes to debates on authoritarian resilience by proposing an integrated framework and concludes with recommendations aimed at deepening democratic accountability in Nigeria.