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Gambling industry harms are a major global public health concern (Van Schalkwyk et al. 2021, Thomas et al. 2023a, Cowlishaw et al. 2025). They contribute to financial hardship, family violence, relationship breakdown, and, in severe cases, suicide (Marionneau et al. 2023). The rapid expansion of online betting and the embedding of gambling within sport and digital environments have intensified exposure and normalized participation (Forrest 2025, Mcgrane et al. 2025, Yeola et al. 2025). Central to this normalization are pervasive marketing systems that saturate everyday media and cultural environments (Pitt et al. 2024, McCarthy et al. 2026). These strategies consistently associate gambling with excitement, mateship, and sporting identity, reframing a high-risk product as an ordinary leisure activity (Coffey et al. 2026). Digital platforms and data-driven marketing extend this reach globally, while ‘dark nudges’ and inducement marketing amplify risks and harms (Mcgarrigle et al. 2026). Evidence shows that early and repeated exposure positively shapes gambling attitudes and promotes gambling as a normalized behaviour for young people (Nyemcsok et al. 2021, Thomas et al. 2023b, Royce et al. 2025). Despite this evidence, regulatory responses continue to prioritize industry interests over public health (Thomas et al. 2023a). Few jurisdictions have implemented comprehensive reforms explicitly aimed at protecting young people from commercial gambling practices (Constandt and De Jans 2024, Aonso-Diego et al. 2025). Most policy responses remain fragmented, incremental, and are arguably shaped through ongoing negotiation with industry actors (Van Schalkwyk and Cassidy 2024, Van Schalkwyk and Cassidy 2025). Even where major public inquiries have called for evidence-based reform, governments have failed to act (Thomas et al. 2023b). The Australian Government’s recent response to a comprehensive parliamentary inquiry into online gambling exemplifies this pattern, presented as significant progress but falling short of the structural reform required to address the drivers of harm. In 2022, growing concern about the normalization of gambling, especially through sport, prompted a cross party parliamentary inquiry into online gambling in Australia, chaired by the late Peta Murphy MP (Standing Committee on Social Policy and Legal Affairs 2022). Referred by the Minister for Social Services, the inquiry in the House of Representatives examined the full scope of online gambling—from products and advertising to regulation and support services. Its terms of reference were broadened early to adopt more inclusive, non-stigmatising language, shifting from ‘problem gamblers’ to ‘lived experience of gambling harm’. The inquiry received 161 submissions and 26 exhibits, and held 13 public hearings with a range of stakeholders, including the gambling industry, broadcasters, sporting codes, health organizations, academics and those with lived experience of gambling harm (together with some family members) (Standing Committee on Social Policy and Legal Affairs 2022). The resulting report ‘You win some, you lose more: Online gambling and its impacts on those experiencing gambling harm’ (which became widely known as the ‘Murphy Report’) set out a comprehensive suite of public health recommendations to prevent gambling harm (Standing Committee on Social Policy and Legal Affairs 2023). The 31 recommendations of the report included a phased in complete tobacco style ban on gambling advertising; a national regulator focused on harm reduction; stronger consumer protection measures such as banning inducements; and formal recognition of gambling as a public health issue. The Murphy Report quickly became a focal point for advocacy, with researchers, lived experience experts, politicians and the media drawing on its findings to call for meaningful online gambling reform (Cannane 2025, Daniel 2025, Australian Medical Association 2026, Pocock 2026). It also triggered pushback from groups with vested interests, who mobilized against key recommendations particularly in relation to the report’s recommendation for a full, phased in advertising ban. Industry stakeholders argued that tighter regulation would drive consumers to offshore and illegal gambling markets (Responsible Wagering Australia 2025), undermine the viability of free-to-air television (Free TV Australia 2023), and affect funding for grassroots and professional sport (Baum 2023). The Australian Government's response to the inquiry was due within six months (Chaney 2026). However, sustained delays and the absence of a substantive response drew criticism over industry influence, reliance on unevidenced statistics, and repeated appeals of ‘complexity’ to justify inaction (Cannane 2024b, Barlow 2026). On 2 April 2026, more than 1000 days after the release of the Murphy Report, the Government finally responded, announcing its planned reforms on the Thursday before the Easter long weekend—when media and political scrutiny are typically reduced, and amid intense media focus on escalating tensions with Iran. While claiming ‘strong action to protect Australians, particularly children and young people, from the harms of gambling’, the response fell short of the Murphy Report’s 31 recommendations, instead advancing a range of partial and individual responsibility measures (Prime Minister of Australia 2026). These included reducing television advertising caps (from 8 to 3 ads per hour between 6 am and 8.30 pm), restricted radio advertising during school drop-off and pick-up times, removal of gambling promotions from sports uniforms and stadiums, bans on celebrities and athletes appearing in advertising, and limits on digital gambling advertising unless users were logged in, over 18, and able to opt out of marketing. Importantly, these measures still need to progress through the parliamentary legislative process, where they will continue to face parliamentary scrutiny and stakeholder pressure. The Government has sought to present its position as signalling action and a step forward. But the measures involved also carry the hallmarks of political compromise, and avoidance of direct confrontation with powerful commercial actors who derive substantial revenue from gambling advertising and sponsorship. Arguing that ‘the solutions aren’t always just to ban things’ and that the Government had ‘got it right,’ the Prime Minister presented the reforms as a measured response to competing public expectations—one that preserved the ability to ‘have a punt’ while offering opt-out protections for those who wished to avoid exposure to marketing (Barlow 2026). In subsequent media interviews, senior government ministers stated that ‘pressure was brought to bear from all sides’ (Barlow 2026), highlighting the contested political environment in which the decisions were made and the influence of the views of those with political access. After reviewing the evidence, the Murphy Report concluded that ‘partial bans on gambling advertising do not work.’ (Standing Committee on Social Policy and Legal Affairs 2023, iv). By taking a partial approach, the Australian Government signalled its willingness to preserve large segments of the gambling marketing ecosystem, sustaining the industry’s capacity to promote its products in highly visible and sophisticated ways. The advertising ‘cap’ continues to normalize and legitimise gambling, and there is no clear evidence that the 8.30 pm cut off accurately reflects young peoples’ media viewing patterns, with studies showing that they continue to watch television after this time (Thomas et al. 2018, Cannane 2024a). Crucially, rather than reducing exposure to advertising, partial bans simply continue and redistribute it. In a context where gambling is already embedded across sport, media, and digital environments, limiting select channels will not meaningfully reduce overall exposure. By targeting only certain forms of advertising (and even those in a limited manner), the proposed reforms risk accelerating a shift to less visible, less regulated tactics. Tobacco control provides a clear precedent. Partial bans drove the expansion of special offers, creative packaging, and other forms of indirect promotion that proved just as influential as traditional advertising (Henriksen 2012, Ling et al. 2022). These risks are amplified in contemporary marketing environments. While the Australian reforms restrict some advertising and introduce opt-out mechanisms, some of the industry’s most powerful marketing tools are left untouched, such as influencer marketing which is highly appealing to young people (Pitt et al. 2024); algorithmic targeting (Parker et al. 2024); and inducements (linked to increased uptake and riskier betting) (Ó Ceallaigh et al. 2025). We can predict that marketing spend will also shift into less regulated spaces—such as podcasts which are widely consumed by younger audiences, and are increasingly attractive to advertisers (Taylor 2024; Brooks et al. 2022). Host-read promotions in podcasts also blur the line between content and advertising, carrying heightened persuasive influence, and are difficult to opt out from (Moe 2023, Wang and Chan-Olmsted 2024). On the basis of experience from this and other areas, we can safely predict that there will be further innovative approaches to marketing. More broadly, while framed as protective, measures such as online opt-outs and logged-in advertising restrictions shift responsibility onto individuals to manage exposure. These approaches are constrained by the complexity and limited transparency of digital advertising systems, which may reduce their capacity to meaningfully limit exposure (Goodwin 2022). Partial bans must be understood within the political economy that shapes regulatory decision making. Despite strong evidence and broad support for full implementation of the Murphy Report, the Government’s response reflects political compromise, raising serious concerns about the role of vested interests in shaping outcomes on major public health issues. As the literature on the commercial determinants of health demonstrates, harmful industries seek to actively shape policies to protect and extend their market power (Hawkins et al. 2012, Herzog-Hawelka and Gupta 2023, Miller et al. 2023, Watts et al. 2023). In this context, partial bans are not simply weak policies, they can indicate regulatory capture, creating the appearance of meaningful intervention while leaving the underlying drivers of harm intact. Indeed, by complying with limited restrictions, industries can also position themselves as part of the solution to the problems that they have caused. Such measures risk stabilizing and legitimizing harmful systems, compounded by the Government’s failure to follow the Murphy Report’s recommendation to establish a National Regulator with ‘the sole purpose of reducing harm and with responsibility for all licencing and regulation’ (Standing Committee on Social Policy and Legal Affairs 2023, xix). Effective reform requires comprehensive restrictions and strong, independent oversight. Without both, regulation remains fragmented, weak, and vulnerable to industry influence. The Murphy Report has been widely recognised as a comprehensive, evidence-based blueprint for preventing online gambling harm. The recommendations from the report have been backed by sustained advocacy from politicians, public health experts, and community groups, alongside strong public support for decisive action to protect children and young people. Meaningful gambling reform is both justified and expected. The Government’s delayed and partial response to the report should be the stimulus for further pressure and accountability for gambling reform. Limited advertising restrictions combined with the refusal to establish a National Regulator leave critical gaps that industry can readily exploit. This approach risks a familiar public health failure—when regulation lags behind industry innovation, harm persists. Without comprehensive reform, advertising will continue, and gambling will continue to be normalized for young people. Anything less than full implementation of the recommendations of the Murphy Report allows the problem to evolve faster than the policy designed to address it. None declared. S.T. has received funding for gambling research from the Australian Research Council, Victorian Responsible Gambling Foundation, VicHealth, Healthway, NSW Office of Responsible Gambling, Department of Social Services, ACT Gambling and Racing Commission, Healthway, and Deakin University. She holds the position of Editor-in-Chief for Health Promotion International. H.P. has received funding for gambling research from the Australian Research Council, Victorian Responsible Gambling Foundation, VicHealth, NSW Office of Responsible Gambling, Department of Social Services, ACT Gambling and Racing Commission, and Deakin University. She is a member of the Editorial Board for Health Promotion International. S.M. has received funding for gambling research from the Victorian Responsible Gambling Foundation, VicHealth, Department of Social Services, ACT Gambling and Racing Commission, and Deakin University. She is the social media coordinator for Health Promotion International. M.D. has received funding for gambling research from the Australian Research Council, Victorian Responsible Gambling Foundation, Healthway, ACT Gambling and Racing Commission. He is the Chair of the Editorial Boards for Health Promotion International.
Thomas et al. (Mon,) studied this question.