This paper introduces the concept of court-centric autocracy – a constitutional model where an independent judiciary serves as the primary constraint on executive power, while elites are both carefully selected and protected from arbitrary removal. Synthesizing literature on authoritarian constitutionalism (Ginsburg Scheppele 2018; Tushnet 2015), I specify three institutional mechanisms: (1) judicial independence through mixed appointment without executive control, separate financing, and life tenure; (2) elite protection from arbitrary dismissal combined with meritocratic selection and public accountability; (3) judicial antitrust authority that allows a constitutional court to check oligarchic capture ex post. The paper analyzes stability conditions, addresses key objections, discusses citizen-level benefits, illustrates the model with a stylized hypothetical case, and concludes by identifying endogenous risks. A formal game-theoretic appendix demonstrates the self-enforcing nature of the proposed equilibrium. The model is proposed as a theoretical alternative to both classical autocracies and liberal democracies.
Timur Aleksandrovich Galiev (Tue,) studied this question.