Across the Global South, China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is reconfiguring dependency patterns by extending infrastructure projects into non-coastal and peripheral regions, while simultaneously producing new arenas of contestation over autonomy and development. This article advances a corridor hedging framework to explain how landlocked states navigate external infrastructure provision while attempting to retain strategic room for maneuver. Laos serves as a critical case, demonstrating how a small and structurally dependent economy engages BRI without permitting any single actor to monopolize access or influence. Rather than reflecting straightforward alignment with Beijing, Vientiane’s approach rests on the pragmatic diversification of its connectivity portfolio across three principal routes: a longstanding but asymmetric corridor through Thailand, a shorter yet vulnerable corridor through Vietnam, and a rapidly expanding, capital-intensive railway corridor to China. Drawing on various literatures, policy documents, and logistics studies, the article shows how these corridors embody distinct configurations of cost, control, and capacity. Corridor hedging is conceptualized as the purposeful cultivation of multiple transport options to prevent one partner from dictating terms. The article concludes that Laos’s bargaining power stems from maintaining overlapping corridors and suggests that similar strategies are available to other Global South states seeking to enhance developmental autonomy.
Lee et al. (Tue,) studied this question.